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Introduction
ENVISIONING THE GOOD LIFE
IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND BEYOND

cosmologist Stephen Hawking, computer scientist Stuart Russell,
and physicists Max Tegmark and Frank Wilczek published an open letter in the
UK news outlet The Independent, sounding the alarm about the grave risks to
humanity posed by emerging technologies of artificial intelligence. They invited readers to imagine these technologies "outsmarting financial markets, outinventing human researchers, out-manipulating human leaders, and developing
weapons we cannot even understand."' The authors note that while the successful
creation of artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to bring "huge benefits"
to our world, and would undoubtedly be "the biggest event in h uman history ...
it might also be the last." Hawking echoed the warning later that year, telling the
BBC that unrestricted AI development "could spell the end of the human race."
While some AI enthusiasts dismiss such warnings as fearmongering hype, celebrated high-tech inventors Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak, Bill Gates, and thousands
of AI and robotics researchers have joined the chorus of voices calling for wiser
and more effective human oversight of these new technologies.•
How worried should we be? More importantly: what should we do?
AI is only one of many emerging technologies-from genome editing and 3D
printing to a globally networked "Internet of Things" -shaping a future unparalleled in human history in its promise and its peril. Are we up to the challenge
this future presents? If not, how can we get there? How can htmlans hope to live
well in a world made increasingly more complex and unpredictable by emerging
technologies? Though it will require the remainder of the book to fully respond
to that question, in essence my answer is this: we need to cultivate in ow-selves,
collectively, a special kind of moral character, one that expresses what I will call
the technomoral virtues.
1N MAY 201 4,
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What do I mean by technom01"til virtue? To explain this concept will require
introducing some ideas in moral philosophy, the study of ethics. At its most basic,
ethics is about what the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates called the "good
life": the kind oflife that is most worthy of a human being, the kind of life worth
choosing from among all the different ways we might live. While there are many
kinds of lives worth choosing, most of us would agree that there are also some
kinds of lives not worth choosing, since we have better alternatives. For example, a
life filled mostly with willful ignorance, cruelty, fear, pain, selfishness, and hatred
might still have some value, but it would not be a kind of life worth choosing
for ourselves or our loved ones, since there are far happier choices available to
us-better and more virtuous ways that one can live, for ourselves and everyone
around·us. But what does ethics or moral philosophy have to do with technology?
In reality, human social practices, including our moral practices, have always
been intertwined with our technologies.! Technological practices-everything
from agriculture and masonry to markers and writing-have shaped the social,
political, economic, and educational histories of human beings. Today, we depend
upon global systems of electronic communication, digital computation, transportation, mass manufacturing, banking, agricultural production, and health care so
heavily that most of us barely notice the extent to which our daily lives are technologically conditioned. Yet even our earliest ancestors used technology, from
handaxes and spears to hammers and needles, and their tools shaped how they
dealt with one another-how rhey divided their labor, shared their resources and
living spaces, and managed their conflicts. Among our primate cousins, female
chimpanzees have been observed to stop fights among males through technological disarmament-repeatedly confiscating stones from an aggressor's hand. 4
Ethics and technology are connected because technologies invite or afford
specific patterns of thought, behavior, and valuing; they open up new possibilities for human action and foreclose or obscure others. For example, the invention
of the bow and arrow afforded us the possibility of killing an animal from a safe
distance-or doing the same to a human rival, a new affordance that changed
the social and moral landscape. Today's technologies open their own new social
and moral possibilities for action. Indeed, hw11an technological activity has now
begun to reshape the very planetary conditions that make life possible. Thus 2.1st
century decisions about how to live well-that is, about ethics-are not simply
moral choices. They are technomoral choices, for they depend on the evolving affordances of the technological systems that we rely upon to support and mediate
our lives in ways and ro degrees never before witnessed.
While ethics has always been embedded in technological contexts, hwnans
have, until very recently, been rhe primary authors of their moral choices, and the
consequences of those choices were usually restricted to impacts on individual
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or local group welfare. Today, however, our aggregated moral choices in technological contexts routinely impact the well-being of people on the other side
of the planet, a staggering number of other species, and whole generations not
yet born. Meanwhile it is increasingly less clear how much of the future moral
labor of our species will be performed by human individuals. Driverless cars are
already being programmed to make 'ethical' driving decisions on our behalf while
we relax and daydream, even as other cars roll out of the factory programmed to
commit the unethical act of cheating on their innocent owners' emissions tests.5
High-frequency trading algorithms now direct the global flow of vital goods and
wealth at speeds and scales no human observer can follow. Artificially intelligent
life coach apps are here to 'nudge' us when we need to lower our voices, call our
mothers, or write nicer emails to our employees. Advanced algorithms inscrutable to human inspection increasingly do the work of labeling us as combatant
or civilian, good loan risk or future deadbeat, likely or unlikely criminal, hireable
or unhireable.
For these reasons, a contemporary theory of ethics-that is, a theory of what
cotmts as a good life for human beings-must include an explicit conception of
how to live well with technologies, especially those which are still emerging and
have yet to become settled, seamlessly embedded features of the human environment. Robotics and artificial intelligence, new social media and communications
technologies, digital surveillance, and biomedical enhancement technologies are
among those emerging innovations that will radically change the kinds of lives
from which humans are able to choose in the 21st century and beyond. How can
we choose wisely from the apparently endless options that emerging technologies
offer? The choices we make will shape the future for our children, our societies,
our species, and others who share our planet, in ways never before possible. Are
we prepared to choose well?
This question involves the future, but what it really asks about is our readiness to make choices in the present. The 21st century is entering its adolescence,
a time of great excitement, confusion, and intense anxiety, an age both wildly
hopeful and deeply troubled. As with many adolescents, our era is also deeply
self-absorbed. In popular and scholarly media, we find both historical consciousness and the 'long view' of humanity giving way to an obsessive quest to define
the distinctive identity of the present age, an identity almost always framed in
technological terms. Whether we claim to be living in the 'Age of Information;
the 'Mobile Era; the 'New Media Age; or the 'Robot Age; we seem to think that
defining the technological essence of our era will allow us to better fathom the
course of its future-ou,. future.
Yet in one of those cruel paradoxes of adolescence, all our ruminations and
fevered speculations about the mature shape of life in this century seem only to
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make the picture more opaque and unsettled, like a stream bottom kicked up by
shuffling feet. Among all the contingencies pondered by philosophers, scientists,
novelists, and armchair futurists, the possibilities presented by emerging technology have proved to be the most enticing to the imagination-and the most difficult to successfully predict. Of course, early visions of a postindustrial technological society were strikingly prescient in many respects. Debates about today's
emerging technologies echo many of the utopian and dystopian motifs of 2.oth
century science fiction: fears and hopes of a ' brave new world' ofbioengineered
humans constructed by exquisite design rather than evolutionary chance; of
humans working side-by-side with intelligent robotic caregivers, surgeons, and
soldiers; of digitally-enabled 'Big Brothers' recording and analyzing our every act;
and of the rise of a globally networked hive mind in the 'cloud' that radically
transforms the nature of human communication, productivity, creativity, and
sociality.
Still, we cannot help but smile wistfully at the lacunae of even our most farseeing science fiction visionaries. In the classic Ray Bradbury tale 'The Veldt;
first published in 1950, we encounter the existential and moral dilemma of the
Hadley family, whose complete surrender to the technological comforts of the
'Happy-life Home' has stripped their lives of labor, but also of joy, purpose, and
filial love. In a present marked by the increasingly sophisticated design of'smart
homes; Bradbury's story resonates still. It may have taken a few decades longer
than he expected, but affluent modern families can now, just like the Hadleys,
enjoy a home that anticipates their every personal preference for lighting, room
temperature, music, and a perfectly brewed cup of coffee-and the 'smart homes'
of the future will even more closely approximate Bradbury's vision. We also recognize all too well the Hadleys' parental anxiety and regret when their children,
irretrievably spoiled by the virtual world of their inceractive playroom, fly into an
incandescent rage at the thought of having their electronic anmsements removed.
Yet coday we can only laugh or cry when Lydia, the children's mother, complains that her surrender to domestic technology has left her without "enough to
do;' and too much "time to think." No technologically-savvy 2.1st century parent
can identify with Lydia Hadley's existential plight. 6 Rather, the promised land of
unlimited technological leisure has given way to a reality of electronic overstimulation and hypersaturation, a 2.4-hour ne'\vs cycle, and smanphones on which
your boss texts you from the r 8th hole in Dubai while you sit at the dinner table
wolfi ng down take-out, supervising your child's Web research on whale sharks,
feverishly trying to get caught up on your email, responding to your Facebook
invitations, and updating the spreadsheet figures your colleagues need for their
afternoon presentation in Seoul. Leisure is one thing our age does not afford
most modern technology consumers, who struggle each night to ignore the
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incoming status updates on their bedside devices so that they may grab a few
precious hours of sleep before rejoining that electronic day that knows neither
dusk nor dawn.
Indeed, the contemporary human situation is far more complicated, dynamic,
and unstable than any of the worlds depicted in our first imaginings of a hightech future. Today, exponential leaps in technological prowess and productivity are coeval with widespread economic stagnation, terrestrial resource depletion, and rising ecological instability. A global information society enabled by a
massive electronic communications network of unprecedented bandwidth and
computing power has indeed emerged; but far from enabling a 'new world order'
of a utopian or dystopian sort, the information age heralds an increasingly disordered geopolitics and widening fractures in the public commons. The rapid
an1plification of consumerism by converging innovations and ever-shorter product marketing cycles continues apace; yet far from ensuring the oft-predicted
rise of technocratic states ruled by scientific experts, the relationship between
science, governance, and public trust is increasingly contentious and unsettled.7
Paradoxically, such tensions appear to be greatest where scientific and technical
power have been most successfully consolidated and embedded into our way of
life; consider that the nation that gave birth to Apple, Microsoft, Google, Intel,
Amazon, and other tech behemoths has slashed federal funding for basic science
research, struggled with declining scientific literacy and technical competence
an1ong its population, and adopted increasingly ambivalent and politicized science policy-even as it continues to shower the tech industry with tax loopholes
and political access.8
Such complexities remind us that predicting the general shape of tomorrow's
innovations is not, in fact, our biggest challenge: far harder, and more significant,
is ilie job of figuring out what we will do with these technologies once we have
them, and what they will do with us. This cannot be done without attending to
a host of interrelated political, cultural, economic, environn1ental, and historical
factors that co-direct human innovation and practice. Indeed, a futurist's true
aim is not to envision the technological future but our technosocial future- a
future defined not by which gadgets we invent, but by how our evolving technological powers become embedded in co-evolving social practices, values, and
institutions. Yet by tl1is standard, our present condition seems not only to defy
confident predictions about where we are heading, but even to defy the construction of a coherent narrative about where exactly we are. Has the short history of
digital culture been one of overall human improvement, or decline? On a developmental curve, are we approaching the next dizzying explosion of technosocial
progress as some believe, or teetering on a precipice awaiting a calan1itous fall, as
oiliers wou ld have it?9
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Should it matter whether our future can be envisioned with any degree of
confidence? Of course we might want co know where we are and where we are
heading, but humans characteristically want a lot of things, and not all of these
are necessary or even objectively worthwhile. Could it be that our understandable adolescent curiosity about what awaits us in our century's adulthood is, in
the grand scheme of things, unimportant to satisfy? Let us imagine for the sake
of argument that given certain efforts, we could better predict the future shape
of life in this century. Other than idle curiosity, what reason would we have to
make such efforts? Why not just take the future as it comes? Why strain to see
any better through the fog of technosocial contingencies presently obscuring our
view? There is a simple answer. Om growing technosocial blindness, a condition that I will callttcute technosocial opacity, makes it increasingly difficult to
identify, seek, and secure the ultimate goal of ethics-a life worth choosing; a life
lived weLL.
Ethics, defined broadly as reflective inquiry into the good life, is among the
oldest, most universal, and cultmally significant intellectual preoccupations of
human beings. Few would deny that humans have always and generally preferred
co live well rather than badly, and have sought useful guidance in meeting this
desire. Yet the phenomenon of acute technosocial opacity is a serious problem
for ethics-and a relatively new one.'0 The founde rs of the most enduring classical traditions of ethics-Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Confucius, the Buddha-had
the luxury of assuming that the practical conditions under which they and their
cohorts lived would be, if not wholly static, at least relatively stable. While they
knew that unprecedented political developments or natural calamities might at
any time redefine the ethical landscape, the safest bet for a moral sage of premodern times would be that he, his fellows, and their children would confront essentially similar moral opportunities and challenges over the course of their lives.
Without this modest degree of foresight, ethical norms would seem to have
little if any power to guide our actions. For even a timeless and universally binding ethical principle presupposes that we can imagine how adopting that principle today is likely to sustain or enrich the quality of our lives tomon·ow. Few are
moved by an erhical norm or ideal until we have been able to envision its concrete
expression in a future form of life that is possible for us, one that we recognize
as relevantly similar to, but qualitatively better than, our current one. When our
future is opaque, iris harder to envision the specific conditions of life we will face
tomorrow chat can be improved by following an erhical principle or rule today,
and such ideals may then fail co motivate us.
While philosophical ethics first emerged in Greece and Asia in the 6th-4th
centuries DCE, the need for ethical guidance as we face our future applies equally
co modern sysrems of etl1ics. Yet modern ethical frameworks often provideftwer

Introduction

7

resources for mitigating the difficulty posed by an uncertain future than do classical traditions. For example, the ethical framework of x8th century German
philosopher Immanuel Kant supplied a single moral principle, known as the categorical imperative, which is supposed to be able to resolve any ethical d ilemma. It
simply asks a person to consider whether she could will the principle upon which
she is about to act in her particular case to be universally obeyed by all ocher persons in relevantly similar cases." If she can't will her own 'subjective' principle of
action to function as a universal rule for everyone to follow, then her act is morally wrong. So if! cannot will a world in which everyone lies whenever it would
spare them trouble, then it cannot be righ t for me to lie.
Although it can be applied to any situation, the rule itself is highly abstract and
general. It tells us nothing specific about the shape of moral life in x8th century
Europe, nor that of any other time or place. At first we might think this makes the
principle more useful to us today, since it is so broad that it can apply to any future
scenario we might imagine. Yet this intuition is mistaken. Consider the dutiful
Kantian today, who must ask herself whether she can will a future in which all
our actions are recorded by pervasive surveillance tools, or a future where we all
share om lives with social robots, or a future in which all humans use biomedical technology to radically transform their genes, minds, and bodies. How can
any of these possible worlds be envisioned with enough clarity to inform a person's will? To envision a world of pervasive and constant surveillance, you need
to know what will be done with the recordings, who might control them, and how
they would be accessed or shared. To know whether to will a future full of social
robots, you would first need to know what r·oles such robots wou ld play in om
lives, and how they might transform hun1an interactions. To will a world where
all hun1ans enhance their own bodies with technology, won't you first need to
know which parts of ourselves we would enhance, in what ways, and what those
changes would do to us in the long run, for example, whether we would end up
improving or degrading our own ability to reason morally? Once even a fraction
of the possible paths of technosocial development are considered, the practical
uncertainties will swamp the cognitive powers of any Kantian agent, paralyzing
her attempt to choose in a rational and universally consistent manner.
Modern utilitarian ethics of the sort p romoted by 19th-century British philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill fares little better by telling us
that we may secure the good life simply by choosing, among the available courses
of action, that which promises the greatest happiness for all those affected. The
problem of discerning which course of action promises the greatest overall happiness or the least harm- among all the novel paths of biomedical, mechanical,
and computational development open to us-is simply incalculable. The technological potentials are too opaque, and too many, to assign reliable probabilities
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of specific outcomes. Moreover, technology often involves effects on humanity
created by the aggregate choices of many groups and individuals. When we facto r
in the interaction effects between converging technologies, social practices, and
institutions, the difficulty becomes intractable.
In their book Unfit for the Futut·e, philosophers lngmar Persson and Julian
Savulescu note that the technological and scientific advances of the 2.oth century
have further destabilized the traditional moral calculus by granting humans an
unprecedented power to bring about "Ultimate H arm:' namely, "making worthwhile life forever impossible on this planet."" We might destroy ourselves with a
bioengineered virus for which we have no natural defenses. Carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and phosphorus from large-scale industry and agriculture may acidify our
oceans and poison our waterways beyond repair. Or we might unleash a global
nuclear holocaust, a risk that experts warn is once again on the rise.'J How can
existential risks such as these, scenarios that would ruin any future possibility for
happiness, possibly be factored into the calculation?
Moreover, emerging technologies such as nanomedicine and geoengineering
in theory have the potential to forestall 'Ultimate Harm' to humanity or to cause
it; and not enough is known to reliably calculate the odds of either scenario. Add
to this the fact that engineers and scientists are constantly envisioning new and
untested avenues of technological development and the insolubility of the moral
calculus becomes even more obvious. John Stuart Mill himself noted that the
practicality of utilitarian ethics relies heavily upon our collective inheritance of
centuries of accunmlated moral wisdom about how ro maximize utility in the
knoUJn human environment.'~ Even on the timescale of our own lives, this environment is increasingly unstable and unpredictable, and it is not clear how much
of our accumulated wisdom still applies.
Given this unprecedented degree of technosocial opacity, how can humans
continue to do ethics in any serious and useful way? The question compels an
answer; to abandon the philosophical project of ethics in the face of these conditions would not only amplify the risk of' Ultimate Harm: it would violate a deepseated human impulse. Consider once again Ray Bradbury, whose stories are still
among the most widely read and appreciated in the trad ition of science fiction.
What drives the imagination of a storyteller like Bradbury, and what makes his
stories resonate with so many? Reading his most lauded works Fahrenheit 45I,
The Mat·tian Chronicles, and the collection The 1/lu.stmtedMan (which leads with
'The Veldt'), one notices how closely Bradbury's vision tracked human beings of a
future Earth, or human descendants of Earth. W hy this anthropological fidelity
in a writer hardly wanting for imaginative horsepower?
Even the Martians in Bradbury's stories serve as literary foils who expose and
reflect upon the distinctive powers, obsessions, and weaknesses of human beings.
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And why is the human future usually envisioned on a time scale of fifty years, or a
hundred and fifty? Why not a thousand years, or ten thousand? Why do so many
of Bradbury's tales have a patently ethical arc, driven less by saintly heroes and diabolical villains than by ordinary, flawed humans working out for themselves how
well or how poorly their lives in an era defined by rockets, robots, and 'televisors'
have gone? Here is one plausible answer: Bradbury seemed compelled to imagine how human beings mor·e o~·less like himself, and those he cared about, would
fare in the not so distant technological future-to envision the possibilities for us
living well with emerging technologies, and more often, the possibilities for our
foiling to live well.
All of this is meant to suggest that the ethical dilemmas we face as liSt century humans are not 'business as usual; and require a novel approach. Now, it is a
common habit of many academics to roll their eyes at the fust hint of a suggestion
that the human situation has entered some radically new phase. As a prophylactic
against overwrought claims of this kind, these sober-minded individuals keep on
hand an emergency intellectual toolkit {which perhaps should be labeled 'Break
Glass In Case of Moral Panic') from which they can readily draw a litany of examples of any given assertion of transformative social change being tnunpeted just as
loudly a century ago, or five, or ten. This impulse is often well-motivated: libraries worldwide are stocked with dusty treatises by those who, either from a lack
of historical perspective or an intemperate desire to sell books, falsely asserted
some massive seismic shift in human history that supposedly warranted great
cultural alarm.
Yet sometimes things really do change in ways that we would be remiss to
ignore, and which demand that we loosen up our scripted cultural patterns of
response. At risk of inviting the scorn of the keepers of academic dispassion, I
suggest that this is one of those times. The technologies that have emerged in the
last half century have led to the unprecedented economic and physical interdependence of nations and peoples and an equally unprecedented transmissibility
of information, norms, ideas, and values. A great many intellectual and cultural
scripts are being rewritten as a result-scripts about modern state power, about
socioeconomic development, labor and human progress, and about our relationship with our environment, to offer just a few examples. The conventional scripts
of philosophical ethics must be rewritten as well. While an irreducible plurality of ethical narratives is both inevitable and desirable in a world as culturally
diverse as ours, we need a common framework in which these narratives can be
situated if humans are going to be able to address these emerging problems of
collective technosocial action wisely and well. This framework must facilitate not
only a shared moral dialogue, but also a global commitment to the cultivation of
the specific technomoral habits and virtues required to meet this challenge.
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Fortunately for us, a tradition already exists in philosophy that can provide
such a framework. That tradition is virtue ethics, a way of thinking about the good
life as achievable through specific moral traits and capacities that humans can actively cultivate in themselves.'1 Part I of this book explains the distinctive advantages of a virtue-driven approach to emerging technology ethics, and anticipates
some of the challenges this project may face. Part II develops the th~oretical foundations for our approach. Here we explore the rich conceptual resources of the
classical virtue traditions of Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist ethics, from
which we construct a contemporary framework of technomoml vir·tues explicitly
designed to foster human capacities for flourishingwith new technologies. Part III
applies the framewo rk to four domains of emerging technology (social media,
surveillance, robotics, and biomedical enhancement technology) that are likely
to reshape human existence in the next one hundred years, assuming that we are
fortunate and prudent enough to make it to the 2.2.nd century.
No ethical framework can cut through the general constraints of technosocial opacity. The contingencies that obscure a clear vision of even the next few
decades of technological and scientific development are simply far too numerous
tO resolve-in fact, given accelerating physical, geopolitical, and cultural changes
in our present environment, these contingencies and their obscuring effects are
likely to multiply ratl1er than diminish. What this book offers is not an ethical
solution to technosocial opacity, but an ethical strategy fo r cultivating the type of
moral character that can aid us in coping, and even flourishing, under such challenging conditions.
The framework developed in the following chapters adapts Aristotelian,
Confucian, and Buddhist reflections on moral development and virtue to our
need for a profile of technomoral virtues for 21st century life.' 6 These will not
be radically new traits of character, for they must remain consistent with the
basic moral psychology of our species. Rather the technomoral virtues are new
alignments of our existing moral capacities, adapted to a rapidly changing environment that increasingly calls for collective moral wisdom on a global scale. In
these challenging circumstances, the technomoral virtues offer the philosophical
equivalent of a blind man's cane. While we face a future that remains cloaked
in a technosocial fog, this need not mean that we go into it unprepared or illequipped, especially when it comes to matters of ethical life. The technomoral
virtues, cultivated through the practices and habi ts of moral self-cultivation that
we can learn from the classical virtue traditions examined in this book, are humanity's best chance to cope and even thrive in the midst of the great tmcertainties and vicissitudes of technosociallife that lie ahead.' 7 This hope will only be
realized, however, if these virtues are more consciously cultivated in our fan1ilies,
schools, and communities, supported and actively encouraged by our local and
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global institutions, and exercised not only individually but together, in acts of collective human wisdom. This is a tall order; but not beyond our capabilities.
There is, however, what philosophers call a 'bootstrapping problem.' Our
hope of flourishing in this and coming centuries-or even of securing our continued existence in the face of species-level threats created by our present lack of
techno moral wisdom-requires us to act very soon to commit significant educational and cultural resources to the local and global cultivation of such wisdom.
The fran1ework articulated in this book, which draws strength from multiple
cultural sources, can help us accomplish just that. Yet our existing technomoral
vices, along with the normal human range of cognitive biases and limitations,
impede many of us from grasping the depth, scope, or immediacy of the threats
to human flourishing now confronting us. Even among those who recogn ize the
dangers, many fail to grasp that the solution must be an ethical one. We cannot
lift ourselves out of the hole we are in simply by creating more and newer technologies, so long as these continue to be designed, marketed, distributed, and
used by humans every bit as deficient in technomoral wisdom as the generations
that used their vast new technological powers to dig the hole in the first place!
While the first step out of the hole requires reallocating individual, local, and
global resources to technomoral education and practice, we can and must make
wise and creative use of technology to aid in the effort. Each of the emerging technologies explored in the book has the potential to be designed and used in ways
that reinforce, rather than impede, our efforts to become wiser and more virtuous
technological citizens. Thus our way out of the hole is a 1·ecursive procedme, in
which traditional philosophical and educational techniques for cultivating virtue
are used to generate the motivation to design and adopt new technological practices that shape our moral habits in more constructive ways. These in turn can reinforce our efforts of moral self-cultivation, forming a virtuous circle that makes
us even more ethically discerning in technosocia1 contexts as a result of increasing
moral practice in those domains. This growing moral expertise can enable the development of still better, more ethical, and more sustainable technologies. Used
as alternating and mutually reinforcing handholds, this interweaving of moral
and technological expertise is a practical and powerful strategy for cultivating
technomoral selves: human beings with the virtues needed to flourish together in
the 21st century and beyond.

The Motivation of the Book
I was driven to write this book by a deep moral concern for the future of human
character, one that arose over many years of watching my own moral and intellectual habits, and those of my students, be gradually yet profoundly transformed
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by ever new waves of emerging digital technology. Far from regarding my initial
classroom forays into this ropic as silly technophobia, my students responded
with overwhelming gratitude, even desperation, for a chance to talk about how
their own happiness, health, security, and moral character were being shaped by
their new technological habits in ways that often bypassed their understand ing
or conscious choice.
These concerns will be familiar to readers of popular writing on digital culture. Nicholas Carr, Evgeny Morozov, and Jaron Lanier are just a few of the prominent cultural critics who have recently expressed alarm at the possibility, even
likeli hood, that our med iatized digital culture is undermi ning core human values,
capacities, and virtues. Carr's The Shall01vs warns us of deleterious cognitive and
moral effects that our new digital consumption habits may be having on our
brains. Morozov's The Net Delusion and To Save Everything, Click Here challenge
our unreflective faith in technocratic 'solutionism.' From Lanier, a computer scientist and pioneer innovator of virtual reality technology, came the widely read
humanistic manifesto You At"e Not a Gadget, which laments the domi nation of
contemporary technosocial life by t he increasingly libertarian and antihumanistic values celebrated by many Silicon Valley technologists: unrestrained capitalism, consumerism, and reductive efficiency.
This book shares with these critics a deeply humanistic and explicitly moralized conception of value. It assumes that the 'good life; by which we mean a
human future worth seeking, choosing, building, and enjoyi ng, must be a life
lived by and with persons who have cultivated some degree of ethical character.
It assumes that t his is the only kind of h uman life that is truly worth choosing,
despite the perpetual challenges we encounter in build ing and sustaining such
lives. It also holds that a good and choiceworrhy life has never been attained in
any great measure by isolated individuals, but only by persons who were fortunate enough to enjoy some degree of care, cooperation, and support from other
hwnans, and who were highly motivated to give the same. This book is therefore
fundamentally inconsistent with antihumanistic and neoliberal philosophies,
and if Lanier is righ t, inconsistent with the philosophy of many of those driving
the emerging technological developments it proposes to examine.
Yet the reader will also find in this book a resolute hope for the future of
human flourishing with, not without or in spite of. the technosocial innovations
that will continue to shape and enrich our lives for as long as human culture endures. As a scholar who chose out of all possible specialties the philosophy of
science and technology, who as a young girl wrote adventure games in BASIC
for her Commodore PET and eschewed the Barbie Oream'Vette in favo r of Star
Wars AT-AT and X-Wing toys, it is simply impossible for me to be antitechnology, personally or philosophically. Indeed, to be antitechnology is in some sense
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to be antihuman, for we are what we do and make, and humans have always engi-

neered our worlds as mirrors of our distinctive needs, desires, values, and beliefs.
Of course we are not alone-increasingly, researchers find other intelligent animals such as birds, elephants, and cephalopods reshaping their environments and
practices in surprisingly skillful and creative ways. Perhaps to be antitechnology
is also to be antilife, or antisentience. But however widely we share this part of
ourselves with other creatures, humanity without technology is not a desirable
proposition-it is not even a meaningful one. The only meaningful questions
are: which technologies shall we create, with what knowledge and designs, affording what, shared with whom, for whose benefit, and to what g-reater ends? These
are the larger questions driving this book. Yet humans lacking the technomoral
habits and virtues described within its pages could, I think, never hope to answer
them. Let us not surrender that hope.

